Prof Ujjwal K Chowdhury
India still holds elections. People still queue up at polling booths. EVMs still record votes. Results are still declared. Governments still change in some states. On the surface, the democratic machine looks alive.
But democracy is not only about voting day. Democracy is also about the field on which the game is played, the rules that govern the contest, the referee who enforces those rules, and the confidence that the referee is not playing for one side. The two attached notes on global democratic decline make this point sharply: modern democracy often does not die through a military coup; it is hollowed out step by step through legal-looking changes, captured institutions, weakened media, pressured opposition, and elections held on an unequal field. The notes describe this as “executive aggrandizement” — elected rulers using legal power to weaken the institutions that should limit them.
In India, this danger is no longer theoretical. The question is not whether elections happen. They do. The deeper question is whether elections remain free, fair, fearless and equal.
The Umpire’s Appointment: The First Big Change
The Election Commission of India is not a normal department. It is the constitutional referee of the republic. It prepares electoral rolls, supervises elections, enforces the Model Code of Conduct, recognises parties, freezes symbols, orders transfers of officials during elections, and can change the rhythm of political power.
That is why the appointment of Election Commissioners is central to electoral fairness.
In March 2023, the Supreme Court in the Anoop Baranwal case said that Election Commissioners should not be appointed only through executive control. It created an interim selection committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India, until Parliament made a law. The logic was simple: the ruling party cannot be allowed to practically choose the umpire by itself.
But Parliament then passed the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023. Under this law, the selection committee became: the Prime Minister, one Union Cabinet Minister, and the Leader of Opposition or the leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha. In plain English, two out of three members can now come from the ruling side. PRS Legislative Research has clearly noted that this selection process “may be dominated by the government,” with implications for the independence of the Election Commission.
This is not a small technical change. It changes the balance of trust. Earlier, the Supreme Court brought in the Chief Justice to create a neutral institutional counterweight. The new law removed that counterweight and replaced it with a Cabinet Minister from the government itself.
Vacancy or No Vacancy, the Government Can Still Decide
The same 2023 law also says that recommendations of the selection committee remain valid even if there is a vacancy in the committee. PRS flagged the risk clearly: accepting recommendations despite a vacancy may effectively lead to a “monopoly of government members” in selecting candidates.
Imagine a cricket match where the captain of one team helps choose the umpire, then says the choice will remain valid even if the opposition representative is absent. That may still be called a procedure. But can it inspire faith?
The problem becomes sharper because the Search Committee, which shortlists names, is headed by the Cabinet Secretary. The eligible pool is also largely restricted to those who are or have been Secretary-level officers in the central government. So the shortlist comes from a bureaucracy controlled by the government, and the final choice is made by a committee where the government has two out of three votes.
This is not institutional independence. It is institutional dependence dressed as law.
Immunity Without Accountability
The next alarm bell is Section 16 of the 2023 CEC Act, which grants protection to the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners from legal proceedings for acts done in their official capacity. The Supreme Court has issued notice to the Centre and the Election Commission on a PIL challenging this provision, filed by Lok Prahari. The Court declined to stay the provision for now, but the fact that it is under judicial scrutiny itself shows the seriousness of the issue.
Protection for honest official action is understandable. Election Commissioners must not be harassed for every difficult decision. But blanket or excessive immunity creates another danger: if the referee’s decisions can change the fate of governments, and if the referee is selected through an executive-dominated process, then immunity must be balanced by strong accountability. Otherwise, power becomes insulated from scrutiny.
The basic democratic principle is simple: independence does not mean unaccountability. A judge is independent, but gives reasoned orders. A constitutional authority is protected, but not placed beyond public trust.
The Model Code: A Tiger With Missing Teeth
The Model Code of Conduct is supposed to create a level playing field during elections. It bars communal appeals, misuse of official machinery, announcement of new schemes, and mixing government work with election campaigning. But the MCC is not a full statutory law. It depends heavily on the Election Commission’s moral authority and Article 324 powers. Drishti IAS summarises the problem well: the MCC regulates parties, candidates and government, but lacks direct statutory backing; its effectiveness is challenged by weak enforcement, digital misinformation, incumbency advantage and misuse of state machinery.
A weak code becomes dangerous when the ruling party has the loudest microphone.
During the 2024 Lok Sabha election, the opposition accused the Election Commission of not acting strongly against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speeches, including complaints around religiously divisive language. Reuters reported that the Congress-led opposition said “no meaningful action” had been taken despite complaints, and quoted former CEC S.Y. Qureshi warning that damage to the Election Commission’s credibility would harm the legitimacy of India’s democracy.
The Associated Press also reported the controversy around Modi’s Rajasthan speech, where Congress accused him of hate speech after he referred to Muslims as “infiltrators.” AP noted that the Congress filed a complaint with the ECI alleging violation of rules that bar candidates from aggravating religious tensions, and that the code forbids appealing to caste or communal feelings to secure votes.
The issue is not only one speech. The issue is whether action is swift and equal. If a small opposition leader is pulled up immediately, but a top ruling leader gets delay, silence, or a notice to the party president instead of direct accountability, the message travels faster than the order: some players are too powerful for the referee.
Money Power: The Hidden Rulebook
Elections are not fought only with slogans. They are fought with money: rallies, aircraft, advertising, WhatsApp armies, data teams, influencers, media buys, booth management and campaign staff.
The electoral bonds scheme changed the funding game by allowing anonymous, unlimited political donations through SBI-issued bonds. In February 2024, the Supreme Court struck down the scheme as unconstitutional for violating voters’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a). The Court ordered disclosure of bond data.
The numbers reveal the scale of imbalance. Reuters reported that the BJP was the largest beneficiary of electoral bonds, receiving nearly half of the ₹165 billion worth of bonds sold between January 2018 and February 2024. Reuters also reported that, as of March 2023 public filings, the BJP had a war chest of ₹70.4 billion, almost ten times Congress’s ₹7.7 billion.
After electoral bonds were struck down, electoral trusts became even more important. ADR’s analysis for FY 2024–25, reported by Times of India, found that 10 electoral trusts distributed ₹3,826.3 crore to political parties; the BJP received 82.5%, or ₹3,157.6 crore, while Congress received 7.8%, or ₹298.7 crore.
This is not just about who raises more funds. In a democracy, unequal money power becomes unequal speech power. One party can dominate billboards, prime-time narratives, digital targeting and local campaign machinery. When the state is also in its hands, the advantage multiplies.
Agencies as Political Weather
Another part of the playing field is the use of state agencies. Reuters reported in 2024 that the Enforcement Directorate had summoned, questioned or raided nearly 150 opposition politicians since 2014, compared with four BJP politicians, according to Reuters’ compilation. It also reported that ED searches jumped from 112 in the first nine years of the PMLA under the previous Congress-led government to 3,010 in the first eight years of Modi’s rule from 2014–15 to 2021–22.
The government says agencies act independently and are fighting corruption. Corruption must indeed be investigated, whether in government or opposition. But the numbers raise a fairness question: if the law mostly lands on one side of politics, especially before elections, the legal process itself begins to influence the electoral process.
The freezing of Congress bank accounts before the 2024 election added another layer. Reuters reported that Congress accused the Modi government of crippling it before the general election by freezing accounts in an income-tax case; Rahul Gandhi said the party could not carry out campaign work, while the BJP denied political targeting and said tax law was being followed. Later, the Income Tax department told the Supreme Court it would not pursue a ₹35 billion payment from Congress until after elections.
Even if every legal action is individually defended, the timing matters. In elections, timing is power.
Voter Rolls: The Election Before the Election
The voter list is where the election actually begins. A voter removed wrongly has already lost before polling day. Dead voters, duplicate entries and migrated voters must be removed. But revision must be transparent, slow enough, appealable, and sensitive to poor citizens who may not have perfect documents.
In Bihar’s Special Intensive Revision controversy, an ADR-hosted article noted that 64 lakh voters had been flagged as of July 2025. Spread over 40 Lok Sabha constituencies, that is 1.6 lakh per constituency. The same article noted that the narrowest 2024 Lok Sabha victory margin was only 48 votes in Mumbai North West, and that in Assembly elections, margins are even smaller.
That is the arithmetic of disenfranchisement. You do not need to delete everyone. In a close election, a few thousand names in the right booths can change the seat. A few changed seats can change the government.
“One Nation, One Election”: Efficiency or Centralisation?
The proposed Constitution 129th Amendment Bill, 2024, on simultaneous elections, is another major change in the rules of the game. The government argues that frequent elections cost money, disrupt governance and keep the Model Code in force repeatedly. Reuters reported that the Union Cabinet accepted the recommendation for simultaneous national and state elections in September 2024, while opposition parties argued it could violate India’s federal politics.
PRS notes that the Bill would allow Lok Sabha and Assembly elections together; state assemblies constituted after the appointed date would have their terms end with the Lok Sabha’s term. If a House is dissolved early, fresh elections would be only for the remaining term, not a full five years. PRS also flags a serious concern: the Bill empowers the ECI to recommend postponing a state election to the President, lowering the threshold compared to the present constitutional route under Article 356, which requires parliamentary approval.
This matters because India is a Union of states, not a unitary election machine. State elections are about local issues: farmers, teachers, hospitals, state corruption, local jobs, and regional identity. If all elections are folded into one giant national campaign, the ruling party at the Centre gains a natural advantage through national messaging, central leadership, and national media dominance.
The Pattern: Legal Form, Democratic Damage
The most dangerous changes are often not illegal on their face. A law is passed. A committee is formed. A notice is issued. A code is invoked. An agency acts. A voter list is revised. A donation route is defended as reform.
But taken together, the pattern becomes visible.
The umpire’s selection is changed. The umpire gets stronger immunity. The code becomes weakly enforced. Money becomes heavily unequal. Agencies create pressure on the opposition. Voter rolls become a battlefield. Constitutional changes risk centralising the election calendar.
This is exactly how modern democratic decline works: not by cancelling elections, but by changing the conditions under which elections are fought.
What Must Be Repaired
India does not need less democracy. It needs better rules.
The Election Commission appointment process must be redesigned with a genuinely neutral selection panel, including the Chief Justice of India or another independent constitutional mechanism. Section 16 immunity must be narrowed so honest decisions are protected but bad-faith or mala fide conduct is not beyond challenge. The Model Code must get stronger statutory teeth, with time-bound action and equal penalties for ruling and opposition leaders. Political funding must be fully transparent in real time. Electoral-roll revision must include public audit, booth-level transparency, easy appeal, and special protection for poor, migrant, minority and marginal voters. Central agencies must be insulated from political timing and selective targeting. Parliament must debate electoral laws fully, not pass them through brute majority or opposition suspension.
The vote must not be stolen before voting day. The mandate must not be manufactured by changing the rules, weakening the referee, and then calling the result pure democracy.
India’s republic was built on a simple promise: every citizen is politically equal. That promise cannot survive if one side controls the money, the machinery, the referee, the rulebook and the timing of the match. Elections must not merely be conducted. They must be trusted. And trust begins when the umpire is visibly independent, the rules are visibly equal, and the voter is visibly sovereign.
